What Efforts has the Chinese Government Made to Reduce Educational Inequality in Poor Areas?

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ABSTRACT

Since the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, China’s per capita education level has risen from less than two years to 9.91 years. However, as the province with the lowest per capita education level in China, Tibet has only reached the level of 6.75 years per capita. This illustrates the worrying educational inequality that still exists between China’s poorer and more developed regions. This educational inequality can also be expressed by the Gini coefficient of education. In order to eliminate this educational inequality, the Chinese government has made great efforts. The Chinese government has expanded the demand for education through the right incentive system and the nine-year compulsory education law. On the other hand, the Chinese government directly or indirectly grants subsidies to education suppliers and demanders to achieve the purpose of increasing education output. Based on the positive externality of education itself, the Chinese government attaches great importance to the cultivation of human resources for offspring, and hopes to transform China’s quantity-based demographic dividend into quality-based demographic dividend, and finally realize sustained economic growth. We believe that some education-related policies promulgated by China have indeed reduced educational inequality in poor areas to some extent, but there is still potential for progress in further addressing educational inequality in poor areas by the Chinese government.

1. Introduction

Despite a series of targeted poverty alleviation policies, the poverty rate has dropped significantly. But the gap between rich and poor in China remains severe. One obvious sign is China’s consistently high Gini coefficient. With the transformation of China’s economy from population quantity dividend to population quality dividend, human capital has become the key factor to promote economic growth and social development. To some extent, education promotes the formation of human capital, which is conducive to improving individual competitiveness and comprehensive quality, thus improving individual economic conditions. However, it is worth noting that different parts of China have different levels of education, which is often related to the level of economic development in different regions. At the same time, different families have different levels of investment in their children’s education. In order to avoid further widening education gap between different families and different regions due to economic level and aggravate social polarization, it is necessary to analyze the factors affecting education input and explore the mechanism of relevant policies to improve education inequality.

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From the family level, family economic level will affect children’s educational input, and parents’ preference will affect the allocation of educational resources within the family. From the social point of view, the economic level of different regions will affect the education policy and education development level of the region. In addition, different education policies have different incentive mechanisms, which have different impacts on the education investment of poor families.

Based on the relevant research of many scholars, this paper summarizes the existing research results from two aspects of micro family factors and macro social factors. From the perspective of supply and demand, this paper discusses the influence and mechanism of social support policies on education input of poor families. By analyzing the literature, this paper discusses the relationship between the welfare policy of children in poor families and the investment in family education in China, hoping to provide theoretical basis for the development of the welfare system of children in poor families.

2. Background

The educational gap between underdeveloped regions and developed regions can be illustrated by several typical cities in China: Tibet Autonomous Region, Yunnan, Beijing, and Guangzhou. From 2002 to 2015, the average Gini coefficient of education in China was 0.2280, while that in Tibet was as high as 0.4679, reflecting the poor equity of education. At the same time, the average number of years of education per capita in Tibet is about 5 years, while the average number of years of education per capita in Beijing is 12 years, so there is a large gap in education levels between the two places.

In 2014, taking Tibet and Beijing as examples, the number of people in Tibet who did not go to school reached 1,040, while there were only 295 in Beijing. By 2018, the number of people who did not go to school in Tibet has dropped sharply to 835, which to a certain extent narrows the difference between it and Beijing in this respect. Analogous to the number of students at other school ages, there is a similar trend. By the end of 2020, the pre-school gross enrollment rate, elementary school net enrollment rate and junior high school, high school stage, higher education gross enrollment rate, and compulsory education consolidation rate can reach 87.03%, 99.93%, 106.99%, 90.2%, 56.14%, and 95.03% respectively.

However, Robert Barnett, director of the Modern Tibet Studies Program at Columbia University, said that the official statement on increasing enrollment refers to the number of Tibetans, not the number of Tibetans. Therefore, this may mean that the improvement of the education level in Tibet is due to the Hans who have entered Tibet, rather than the local Tibetans, so the education level of the local people has not been effectively improved. In addition, those who are less capable and cannot work in other highly competitive government departments in China also like to study and work in Tibet, which is more attractive to them. This may also be one of the reasons for there is an increase in the enrollment rate in Tibet.

The government’s national financial education expenditure in 2007 was 828,802,142 million yuan. By 2017, the expenditure had reached four times the amount it was ten years ago. To further compare the difference between the government’s investment in education in Tibet and other regions from 2014 to 2018, Guangdong’s increase in four years was about 50%, Beijing’s was 25%, and Tibet’s increase was 98%. Tibet has established a publicly funded education system for 15 years. It has raised the “three guarantees” standard, which is students enter the school with food, housing, and clothing, and reached an average of 4,200 yuan per student per year. In addition, Tibet has moved schools in high-altitude areas to Lhasa based on actual conditions and adopted policies to solve the problem of sparsely populated education.

Table 1. Number of populations with education level (Sampling ratio is 0.82%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>No Schooling</th>
<th>Regular Junior School</th>
<th>Regular Senior School</th>
<th>Junior College and above</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Beijing</td>
<td>295</td>
<td>4658</td>
<td>3684</td>
<td>6420</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guangdong</td>
<td>3088</td>
<td>35212</td>
<td>17540</td>
<td>7693</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yunnan</td>
<td>2977</td>
<td>12096</td>
<td>3569</td>
<td>2454</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tibet</td>
<td>1040</td>
<td>304</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beijing</td>
<td>351</td>
<td>3452</td>
<td>2302</td>
<td>4098</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guangdong</td>
<td>2937</td>
<td>33986</td>
<td>14688</td>
<td>3997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yunnan</td>
<td>2993</td>
<td>12369</td>
<td>2983</td>
<td>1494</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tibet</td>
<td>835</td>
<td>458</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China
Government investment is also reflected in the improvement of school and teacher resources. In order to improve the basic conditions for running schools with weak compulsory education, Tibet has newly built or expanded 832 elementary schools and 92 junior high schools, and 20 counties have passed the national assessment of the balanced development of compulsory education. The consolidation rate of compulsory education has reached 90% as well. In addition, Tibet has established a financial aid policy system for students with financial difficulties from pre-school to postgraduate education, with 37 various student aid policies. It can be concluded from the table that the number of schools and teachers in various regions has increased to a certain extent, among which Yunnan and Guangdong are the most obvious ones.

Table 3. The situation of regular colleges and universities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Number of Schools</th>
<th>Number of Teachers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Beijing</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>142267</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guangdong</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>149348</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yunnan</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>48833</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tibet</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3640</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China

However, even though the state’s investment in Tibetan education has doubled, the actual quality of Tibetan education has not been significantly improved. From 2014 to 2018, the number of schools in Tibet has only increased by one, and the number of teachers has increased by only about 100, which is still a big gap compared with other provinces. The reason why this happens is that it is difficult for China to change the fundamental difference between Tibetans and Hans only through capital investment. It can only improve the difference in educational opportunities between Tibetans and Hans to a certain extent.

In 2010, the average number of years of education for the main working-age population in Yunnan was about 7 years. By 2015, the number had risen to 9.5 years. Among them, the proportion of people with higher education rose from 9% to 13%, and the proportion of people with high school education and above in the labor force has risen from 70% to 82%. After the implementation of “the 13th Five-Year Plan”, the number of years of education in Yunnan’s main laborers has reached 11 years by 2020, and the proportion of laborers with high school education and above has increased significantly to 90%. Similarly, the average years of education for the main working-age population in Tibet increased from 8.8 years in 2015 to 10.2 years in 2020, and the average years of education for the newly added labor force reached 13.1 years. Compared with the average number of years of education of the working-age population in China, which is 10.8 years, Tibet, Yunnan, and other places have been equal to this value or even higher than this value. The average number of years of education for the working-age population in Shanghai is 12.6 years. This value in Tibet is only about one year behind Shanghai, and the gap is further narrowing.

3. The Importance of Education

The reason why the Chinese government has improved education in poor areas by promulgating a large number of policies and increasing financial expenditure on education is that high-quality education with a high penetration rate not only has economic significance for the whole society but also has a positive impact on individuals. This also shows that education has obvious positive externalities, especially for poor areas.

3.1 Economic Factors

Education, as an activity to train talents, is an important component of social development, and its development must be based on the economy. Its underlying logic is embodied as follows: economic development determines educational development, education development promotes economic development[9].
3.1.1 Promoting Economic Growth

At present, China is developing from a low- and middle-income country to a high- and middle-income country. In this process, China will face the demographic dividend generated by the population age structure. However, some researches show that China’s quantity-based demographic dividend shows a declining trend due to the decreasing fertility rate year by year \(^{(2)}\). The government has issued a series of policies to expand the supply and demand of education and improve the quality of education. These policies aim to continuously increase national income and transform the advantage of age structure into the advantage of talent structure \(^{(20)}\). The ultimate goal of the Chinese government is to replace the quantitative-based demographic dividend with a quality-based one through education.

On the other hand, education improves the quality of the individual and the whole labor force, increases labor productivity, and thus strengthens the power of labor to promote economic growth \(^{(4)}\). The improvement of labor productivity benefits from the reasonable division of labor and the improvement of vocational skills after education \(^{(19)}\). The decisive effect of human capital on economic growth and development mainly lies in the fact that human capital, as a carrier of technological progress, is more subjective than material capital. As we all know, the fundamental driving force for economic growth comes from technological innovation and progress. Under the condition of a constant technological level, economic growth can only be achieved by increasing input, and even a high growth rate does not mean the improvement of economic development level and efficiency. When technology advances, the same input can produce more output, so that economic capacity and efficiency rise in step. Human capital is not only the initiator of technological progress but also the carrier of the use and dissemination of new technologies. Through the role of human capital, the efficiency of commodities and human factors in the production process will be comprehensively improved. Therefore, human capital becomes a decisive factor in promoting economic growth and development.

3.1.2 Education and Employment

The Chinese government’s increased support for the education industry has also improved its employment environment. Expanding the education industry will not only increase many employment opportunities but also effectively solve part of structural unemployment.

In 1985, in China, the central government made nine-year education compulsory, legal, and compulsory for primary and junior high schools. Through expanding the demand for education and making it legally mandatory, the policy has significantly delayed youth employment and reduced their labor force participation rates. Furthermore, this policy has created a large pool of higher-level labor for China. At the same time, also eased the social employment pressure.

Undeniably, the most direct manifestation of the expansion of education demand in the labor market is the increase of relevant employment. According to statistics from China’s Ministry of Education in September 2021, the total number of teachers in China has reached 17,929,700. Since 2021 alone, 1.91 million people have obtained teaching certificates through relevant certifications.

On the other hand, education promotes economic development and increases employment opportunities by training various skilled labor forces. Relevant government policies improve the professional skills and quality of more workers and enhance their social adaptability by expanding labor demand. This improvement of social adaptability can enable individuals to be competent for different kinds of jobs, thus effectively avoiding structural unemployment.

3.2 Individual Factors

For all its benefits to society, education is not an effective incentive for total citizens. Based on the logic that intrinsic motivation is more powerful than extrinsic motivation, an efficient incentive system must effectively drive people to complete a task using intrinsic motivation \(^{(12)}\). Therefore, when citizens know the benefits of their education, they are more willing to learn \(^{(7)}\).

3.2.1 Improve Individual Competitiveness

In terms of independent job seekers, education can serve as a signal that employers can pick up. This is known as the Screening Hypothesis.

Selection in the many job seekers, employers are always want to have the appropriate skills to fill the vacancy, but, when he meets with job seekers in the Labour market, he doesn’t understand how these people’s ability, although he can’t understand the production capacity of the applicant directly, can learn some tangible personal property and the characteristics of job seekers. In the screening hypothesis, education is defined as information, which focuses on how employers select workers in the labor market \(^{(14)}\). Its point of view is that it agrees with the human capital theory that education level and wage income level are directly proportional. A higher education
level leads to a higher salary level.

When employees understand that education has a direct impact on their careers, they are more willing to invest time and energy in learning. This is more common in poor areas, where the majority of students spend far less on education than they get in return, supported by existing policies.

3.2.2 Improve Individual Comprehensive Quality

Education has implications for individuals not only in the workplace but also in their social lives. For example, people with similar educational experiences often find it easier to stay connected and share social resources. Education also helps people improve their self-awareness and judgment, and conveys correct values.

4. Factors Affecting Educational Input

Improving the human capital of future generations, preventing the intergenerational transmission of poverty, and realizing sustainable economic development have become important and key issues facing China. However, education input is not an unilateral problem. That is mainly affected by two aspects which are household choice and national policy.

4.1 Household Choices

There are three main reasons for poor families to reduce their investment in education: the Matthew effect, high education cost, and parental preference for resource allocation. In the long run, in terms of households, reducing investment in their children’s human capital exacerbates social inequality and inefficiency.

4.1.1 Matthew Effect

The Matthew effect means that any individual, group, or region that achieves success and progress in a certain aspect will have an accumulation advantage and will have more chances to achieve greater success and progress. Families of different economic statuses have different inputs of resources and cultural capital for their children, resulting in the “transmission of differential advantage” in family education. This difference lays the foundation for children’s future school education and social education, and is constantly replicated and accumulated in the process of socialization. The inequality of education results, under the influence of narrow social mobility channels, finally confirms the Matthew effect. So that education issues spread into social income differentiation and social equity issues.

4.1.2 High Education Cost

In addition to the inequality caused by the Matthew effect, poor families have to face pressure from the high cost of education. With the gradual improvement of per capita education level and the continuous recognition of the importance of education by the public, the education industry is faced with increasing education costs and diminishing education returns. In China, poor families are defined as those whose members have an annual per capita income of less than 2,300 yuan. However, at the bachelor level, most courses at Chinese universities charge more than 4,000 yuan per year, according to information released by China’s Ministry of Education. Master’s and doctorate programs are more expensive. Without subsidies, it is difficult for poor families to fully absorb the rising cost of education. As a result, many students who are from poor families give up the opportunity to receive higher education after completing the nine-year compulsory education.

4.1.3 Resource Allocation Based on Parental Preference

Education, as a scarce resource, involves the allocation of resources. Social support policies may neglect some family members when providing assistance to families as a unit. For children from poor families, age determines their passivity in obtaining family resources. Adults almost monopolize the resources of children to gain power. Parents of poor families often lack sufficient knowledge of education to understand the long-term negative effects of children deprived of education. Therefore, parents tend to sacrifice the interests of children when there is a conflict between short-term needs and long-term development. It also shows that income distribution among family members does not follow the principle of “equal sharing”. Thus, even if poor families receive subsidies from relevant policies, adults do not necessarily use the relevant welfare income to improve child survival.

4.2 Government Policy

In fact, the proportion and size of education investment are not only influenced by family choices, but also determined by government policies. A good education policy aims to eliminate social inequities and improve social efficiency, especially in poor areas and rural areas. In this chapter, this essay will discuss the educational inequity and compulsory education among different regions in China’s current national conditions.

DOI: http://doi.org/10.26549/jetm.v6i1.9751
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4.2.1 Make Nine-year Compulsory Education Universal

Equitable education systems that meet basic learning needs not only represent a human right but also a means of reducing poverty, increasing productivity, and sustainable development [22]. Therefore, China implements nine-year compulsory education. Seventy years ago, when the People’s Republic of China was founded, 80 percent of China’s 400 million people were illiterate and the average person had less than two years of education. However, according to the latest results of China’s seventh national census, the average Chinese has 9.91 years of schooling.

In Figure 1, although Tibet, the province with the lowest level of schooling per capita, lags Beijing by nearly six years, it is still well above the average at the founding of the People’s Republic of China. The most direct policy that has contributed to this remarkable progress is the implementation of nine-year compulsory education.

![Figure 1. In 2020, The average number of years of schooling in different regions of China](http://doi.org/10.26549/jetm.v6i1.9751)

Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China

Since the implementation of nine-year compulsory education in 1986, the overall quality of the Chinese people has been significantly improved. The reason why nine-year compulsory education can be implemented effectively is that it relieves the burden of education expenditure on poor families. In 2006, China enacted the Compulsory Education Law, which further strengthened the conditions of schools in poor areas and rural areas. The reason why the Chinese government entrusts basic education with compulsory law is because of the positive externalities of basic education itself and its determination to cultivate human capital. Through the mandatory law, families and individuals can avoid the wrong choice to increase the education needs, and government and individuals increase the inputs in education. Ultimately, society benefits from the positive externalities of education.

4.2.2 Educational Inequity

There are significant educational inequities in poor areas and elsewhere in China. For education suppliers, this is mainly reflected in two aspects which are the quantity and quality of teachers. The quantity and quality of teachers in different regions largely depend on the level of local economic development and the available welfare benefits.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>student-teacher ratio (2019)</th>
<th>Primary school</th>
<th>Junior high school</th>
<th>High school</th>
<th>University</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Beijing</td>
<td>13.58</td>
<td>8.33</td>
<td>7.41</td>
<td>16.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HeNan</td>
<td>17.91</td>
<td>14.32</td>
<td>15.61</td>
<td>18.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YunNan</td>
<td>16.69</td>
<td>13.79</td>
<td>14.55</td>
<td>21.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XinJiang</td>
<td>15.57</td>
<td>10.96</td>
<td>11.94</td>
<td>19.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GuiZhou</td>
<td>18.27</td>
<td>13.98</td>
<td>14.57</td>
<td>19.34</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China

In Table 4, the teacher-student ratio represents the average number of students taught by a teacher, which clearly shows the educational inequality that exists in different areas of China. In high schools, for example, the teacher-student ratio in Beijing is almost half that in poorer regions such as Yunnan and Guizhou. This means that high school teachers in Beijing are more able to spend a lot of time and energy tutoring students just in terms of teaching time and teacher energy. This gives information that the students in Beijing objectively have an absolute advantage in terms of teacher resources.

On the other hand, education inequality is not only reflected in the teacher-student ratio, but also the quality of teachers. In Beijing, a group of famous high schools, represented by the high school affiliated to Renmin University of China, allow only teachers with PhDs to teach in some subjects. However, in some remote and poor areas, some teachers are just students who have just graduated from university and become teachers after obtaining relevant certificates. There is no doubt that this is unfavorable to the cultivation of offspring’s human capital.

In order to reduce the gap of educational inequality, the Chinese government has also made efforts. In 2021, China’s Ministries of Education and Finance plan to send 21,000 teachers to teach in poor areas. In addition, since 2018, when the Chinese government implemented the policy, nearly 10,000 retired school principals have gone
to rural areas in poor areas to teach compulsory education. In 2021, the Chinese government plans to recruit 4,500 retired principals to continue teaching in poor areas. The most direct manifestation of a large number of high-quality teachers going to poor areas is that the education supply side has moved to the right, further expanding the total output of education. Then, educational inequality in poor areas can be offset by expanding educational output.

Conspicuously, these policies demonstrate the central government’s determination to reduce educational inequality in poor areas. However, it may be unrealistic to eliminate educational inequality only by relying on current relevant policies. Based on the above student-teacher ratio and the number of teachers going to poor areas mentioned above, 20,000 teachers would only alleviate the educational needs of 250,000 to 300,000 students. That is likely to be a drop in the bucket for the world’s most populous country. This is likely to become more pronounced with China’s new policy to encourage childbirth. China’s education supply may not grow as fast as its demand. In the long run, current policies are limited in eliminating educational inequality. In China, there is still room for progress in eliminating educational inequality in poor areas.

In terms of education input, The dynamic development of human capital determines the different stages of children’s development, further emphasizing the importance of social investment, that is, children who do not receive adequate education in the early stage have the “accumulation of disadvantage” and cannot compete fairly in the next stage, which is also the main reason for the intergenerational transmission of poor families. On the other hand, education also follows the principle of ability to pay. The national policy on compulsory education constructs the boundary between the government and private in the responsibility of human capital investment of social members. The social support policy for children from poor families also reflects the rationality of public power’s intervention on private behavior under the theory of educational compensation. So that the poor families receive state funds to assist with the legitimacy.

5. The Impact of Policy on Education

The government promulgates relevant policies to eliminate social inequity and improve social efficiency because education has obvious positive externalities. The policy logic of government intervention in education mainly has two points. Firstly, the social benefits of education require the government to share the cost of education as one of the beneficiaries. Although the public education expenditure increased with the population growth is a part of the "welfare" expenditure, it is not a burden on the state, but a long-term investment for the sustainable development of human capital. Secondly, the basic right of citizens to education should be guaranteed so that individual citizens can equally enjoy the right to pursue their own development and realize social equity based on educational equity.

5.1 Policies & Total Factor Costs of Education

The government shares the cost of education with families by issuing relevant education support policies. These policies have greatly relieved the pressure on families in poor areas. Total factor costs of education are divided into two categories, namely, the cost of providing education services and the opportunity cost of attending school.

5.1.1 Policies to Reduce the Cost of Providing Educational Services

In poor areas affected by the level of the local economy, it is not realistic for families and individuals to bear the full cost of providing education services, as most families and individuals will voluntarily give up the opportunity to receive education. Government policies help households to share costs largely indirectly.

In China, The Chinese government has not only benefited families in poor areas by making nine-year compulsory education widely available but has also formulated many policies that help foster the human capital of offspring, such as “Two Free and One Help” and “Preschool Education Subsidy”.

The “Two Free and One Help” is that the state provides free textbooks and exemptions from miscellaneous fees for students from poor families in rural compulsory education, and grants certain living expenses to boarders. Under the background of nine-year compulsory education, the policy of “two exemptions and one subsidy” has greatly alleviated poor families’ investment in human capital for their offspring since its implementation. More children can learn without financial pressure.

The “Preschool Education Subsidy” is that local governments shall grant subsidies to children with financial difficulties, orphans and disabled children in public kindergartens established with the approval of education administrative departments at or above the county level. The policy requires each kindergarten to withdraw 3 to 5 percent of its income as a fund to be used for subsidies to poor children. The policy fills a gap in China’s efforts to improve preschool education in poor areas and reduces educational inequality caused by the Matthew Effect.

Whether these policies provide subsidies to the education supply-side or the education demand-side, these policies achieve their purpose of increasing educational
output. For individuals and families in poor areas, they can obviously feel that the subsidies of these policies relieve their pressure on education.

5.1.2 Policies to Reduce the Opportunity Cost of Education

Although the nine-year compulsory education is required by law for every student, many students from poor areas still think the opportunity cost of education is too high, especially with the high prevalence of bachelor’s degrees. In terms of accounting costs alone, many students think it is not a wise choice to give up the opportunity to earn money. However, some government policies, such as the “talent relocation policy” and the “national civil servant exam”, are indeed attractive to some students.

According to Beijing’s point-based residence registration policy, which was recently released in 2021, education is one of the most important indicators. According to the policy, the lowest score is 10.5 for those who graduate from vocational schools and the highest score is 37 for those who earn a doctorate. The main reason why students from poor areas want to get a residence registration of Beijing is that Beijing, as the capital, has more opportunities and better social resources and welfare.

On the other hand, the national civil service exam is also attractive to students from poor areas who have long lacked economic security. Passing the national civil service exam is generally considered to have a permanent and well-paid job. In principle, the national civil service exam requires those with a college degree or above to take the exam. Compared with the high rewards after passing exams, students will feel that learning is meaningful.

Therefore, the government promulgates relevant policies to attract students to accept education. In the eyes of students, the opportunity cost is reduced and the positive externality of education is maximized.

5.2 Income Supplement Effect Caused by the Policy

The income supplement effect of the social assistance policy on the education input of poor families means that the social assistance policy directly increases the family income by distributing the funds to eligible welfare beneficiaries, so that these families are economically able to invest more resources for the cultivation of children's human capital, rather than just to maintain their livelihood.

In mid-2020, the central government allocated 18.84 billion yuan in transfer payments, an increase of 1.99 billion yuan or 11.8 percent over the previous year, to continue to support local governments in successfully implementing the third phase of the action plan for preschool education. When allocating funds, we will continue to increase support for the three regions and three prefectures, and other areas in deep poverty.

Relevant studies show that transfer payments can have a significant impact on household consumption and children’s educational level in the short term, even if there are no strings attached [1]. As households benefiting from the policy receive additional income, their credit constraints are eased, and overall consumption and consumption used to enhance children’s human capital are both increased, such as households buying more goods that promote children’s cognitive development or buying high-quality food for their children [9]. This means that the increase in family income brought about by social assistance will make the redistribution of family resources more favorable to children.

Empirical research results from China also show that, through income supplement, the subsistence allowance policy to a certain extent increases the time for parents in poor families to guide their children to study, alleviates their mental pressure, thus establishing a good family upbringing in poor families and promoting the accumulation of children’s human capital [9]. By contrast, in the limited support for disadvantaged families in the country or region, lack of skills of parents can’t without flexible balance work and family activities, big difference in income between the parents further lead to poor families with other family investment in education investment and economic time highly unequal. As a result, there are significant differences in the development of children of different classes.

The transfer payment policy can increase the family’s investment in education for their children in a short time. And it is conducive to establishing a good way of family education in poor families, to promote the development of minors.

6. Conclusions

According to existing studies, in addition to various factors in the micro family field, social factors, especially macro policies, will also have an important impact on the educational input of poor families. Related research widely confirmed that social support policy for poor family education into the positive effect of the impact on policy mechanism is still unable to agree, the mechanism of action of different forms of social support policies exist significant differences: from the point of view of "the supplier supplies", fiscal policy through the expansion of education resources for poor family education into effect and crowding out, from the perspective of "buyer’s supply" social assistance policy is through the way of transfer pay-
ment to poor families income supplement and reduce the cost of education, the two kinds of social support policies are largely lacking the education of poor families caused by income limit resources, protect the children of the family get equal right to education and development.

In addition, a more in-depth and systematic discussion can be carried out from the following two aspects. The first is to further study the response mechanism of social support policies to poor families’ education investment. Second, in the international perspective, based on the evolutionary logic of welfare policy, education investment as the entry point. By comparing the effects of social support policies on poor families in different countries, explore the impact of social support policies in different countries.

References


